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According to the Leviathan-Model, fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a 
revenue-maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed 
to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states. However, empirical results 
concerning the Leviathan hypothesis are mixed. This study uses a state and local-level panel 
data set of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different 
federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue. Because of the 
considerable tax autonomy of sub-national Swiss governments, it is possible to investigate 
different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size. The results 
indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a 
smaller size of government. Fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government 
revenue for Swiss cantons. The overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax 
revenue but higher user charges. Thus, revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of 
government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges. 
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Taxation enables governments to gain effective political power. Understanding political deci-
sions in the public sector thus requires knowledge about the power to tax of different govern-
ment tiers and the impact of the allocation of taxing powers on government finances. Fol-
lowing  Hettich and Winer (1988, 1997), tax systems are the outcome of an interaction be-
tween rational (private and public) agents who maximize their utility in a framework of col-
lective decision making. In this framework, the fiscal behavior of a government is basically
constraint by exit and voice (Hirschman 1970). Voice in the public sector can be exerted by
democratic decision-making procedures, like competitive elections, popular referendums or
voter initiatives, while exit requires the possibility of citizens migrate and hence vote by feet.
The literature on the impact of electoral competition as an investigation of the voice mecha-
nism starts with the median voter model explaining the observable tax system under majority
rule (Romer 1975, Roberts 1977, Meltzer and Richard 1981, 1983). An extension to this lit-
erature is discussed by Matsusaka (1995) and Feld and Matsusaka (2002). They distinguish
between revenue systems in direct vs. representative democratic systems and provide empiri-
cal evidence that in jurisdictions with fiscal referendums government finances rely more on
user charges than on tax revenues and that tax revenues are lower in a direct democracy com-
pared to a representative democratic system. A related approach focuses on the impact of fed-
eralism on government behavior as an investigation of the exit mechanism (Oates 1972, 1985,
1999, Brennan and Buchanan 1977, 1978, 1980). As argued by Brennan and Buchanan, the
government is able to behave like a revenue maximizing monopoly called a Leviathan. In a
centralized system where only the federal level possesses taxing powers, it is more difficult to
restrict such Leviathan behavior than in a strongly decentralized system with considerable
powers of state and local governments. If different units of government have to share their tax
base, the threat of migration imposes a serious restriction on government behavior.
2
                                                                
1.  Quoted according to Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p. 168)
2.  The problem of vertical fiscal externalities that might occur in a multi-level federalism is not discussed by
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) or Oates (1972). A theoretical analysis of vertical fiscal externalities can be
found in Wrede (1996) or Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).– 2 –
In the empirical literature on the relationship between government decentralization and gov-
ernment size, whether and how fiscal decentralization affects government size is still not
clarified. In particular the potential transmission channels through which decentralization re-
duces public sector size are not investigated explicitly. The purpose of this paper is to analyze
empirically whether a decentralization of the power to tax to sub-federal jurisdictions has an
impact on the size and structure of government revenue of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998.
The main emphasis is on the different mechanisms by which revenue decentralization might
influence the size of the public sector. We distinguish tax competition, tax exporting and
fragmentation as three potential transmission mechanisms that affect government size. The
residual impact of decentralization is interpreted as evidence for laboratory federalism (Oates
1999). Switzerland is particularly suited for such a test because it provides unique data of sub-
federal governments that have extensive autonomy in choosing tax instruments including also
quantitatively important and progressive taxes on income and property.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The different transmission channels by
which fiscal federalism affects government size are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 surveys
the empirical literature on the impact of fiscal federalism on the size and scope of government
revenue. In Section 4, the Swiss tax system is explained in order to demonstrate the impor-
tance of sub-federal Swiss taxing powers. Data and the specification of our empirical model
appear in Section 5 while Section 6 discusses the obtained results. Finally, Section 7 provides
some concluding remarks.
2. Transmission Channels of Fiscal Federalism on the Size of Government
According to Brennan and Buchanan, emigration imposes a serious restriction on the ability
of governments to exploit tax bases. If emigration is possible at low cost, tax bases can avoid
excessive taxation by leaving the jurisdiction that levies taxes. In their decentralization hy-
pothesis Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p. 185) conclude: “total government intrusion into the
economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expen-
ditures are decentralized”. A similar interpretation of fiscal federalism is provided by Oates
(1972). He argues that political agents have a better knowledge of the preferences of their
constituency if the fiscal power is decentralized, such that the provision of public goods can
be tailored more efficiently to their needs. The Wicksellian (1896) connection of spending
and taxing decisions is much tighter on the local than on the federal level.
3 According to
                                                                
3.  Winer (1983) provides empirical evidence that the separation of spending and taxing decisions in Canadian
provinces through the introduction of federal grants caused higher provincial expenditures.– 3 –
Oates (1972) the Wicksellian connection favors a smaller size of government. On the other
hand, as Oates (1985) mentions, if local governments have more information about the prefer-
ences of citizens than central governments and, therefore, public services can be better tai-
lored to the needs of voters, this might increase their demand for public spending leading to a
larger share of government.
4 In a somewhat different analysis, Persson and Tabellini (1994,
2000) theoretically show the importance of decentralization in restricting government discre-
tion to exploit the fiscal commons. Wildasin (1997) follows a similar line of thought by con-
cluding that fiscal indiscipline of sub-federal governments as a result of bail-outs by the cen-
tral government is of minor relevance in a fragmented federalism where sub-federal units are
not considered as being too big to fail.
5
Despite the emphasis on exit as a disciplinary device, it is not clear which mechanism is sup-
posed to lead to a smaller government sector in the first place. Additionally to the decentrali-
zation hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) hence develop a fragmentation
hypothesis: The competitive impact of fiscal federalism depends on the number of possible
alternative jurisdictions that are available for voters and firms and the transaction costs that
migrations induce. They argue: “the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the
number of competing governmental units in the inclusive territory” (Brennan and Buchanan,
1980, p. 185). In a theoretical analysis, Epple and Zelenitz (1981) show, that with increasing
numbers of jurisdictional units, the scope for taxation diminishes although it does not disap-
pear entirely. Of course, decentralization and fragmentation could also lead to inefficiencies
since increasing returns to scale in the consumption of public goods can be exploited to a
lesser extent (Sinn 1997, 2003). The result might be a larger public sector because economies
of scale are not exploited and the provision of public services becomes more inefficient.
A second argument for the dampening impact of decentralization on government size stems
from the tax competition literature, and could be called the tax competition hypothesis (see
Wilson 1999 for a survey). In particular with respect to public revenue, a more intense tax
competition will lead to lower tax rates of the mobile higher income recipients and thus to
lower tax revenue. Mobile taxpayers move to jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax
rates. The lower the mobility costs the higher the pressure for a jurisdiction will be to compete
                                                                
4.  Oates (1985, p. 749) refers to the American economic historian Wallis claiming that this hypothesis is based
on observations from American history.
5.  Qian and Roland (1998) study two effects of federalism: First, a ‘competition effect’ which increases the
opportunity costs of bail-outs and serves as a commitment device for the government under factor mobility;
second, a ‘checks and balance effect’ which serves as a hard budget constraint. Rodden (2002) shows that
intergovernmental grants induce fiscal indiscipline of sub-federal governments through bail-out.– 4 –
with other jurisdictions by lowering tax rates as well. The result is a smaller government sec-
tor. In contrast to the Leviathan model which has revenue maximizing governments by as-
sumption, the tax competition literature evaluates such a government as inefficiently small
however, because the government is supposed to do ‘what it ought to’ (Sinn 1997).
The pressure to reduce the size and scope of the public sector by a decentralization of gov-
ernment is reduced by the possibility of tax exporting (tax exporting hypothesis). Taxes are
exported to nonresidents if they pay some of the taxes of sub-federal jurisdictions. State and
local governments thus have an incentive to provide public services at a higher level than their
residents prefer. An example of tax exporting can be found in the taxation of tourist trade or
of natural resources in some U.S. states. Already for the year 1962, McLure (1967) estimated
for the U.S. states that overall tax export rates were between 19 and 28 percent in the short
run. Tax exporting need not be restricted to natural resource taxes. It is also possible in the
case of corporate income taxes on foreign owned firms (Sørensen 2002).
While Oates (1972) emphasizes the advantage of a decentralized government with respect to
preference costs of centralized provision of public services, Oates (1999) more strongly un-
derlines the role of laboratory federalism. A decentralized competitive government structure
allows for an experimentation of new public policies without doing too much harm if they
fail. Successful government policies in one jurisdiction are imitated and adapted by other ju-
risdictions at the same, lower or higher government level. Federalism then becomes a discov-
ery procedure for new public solutions (Schnellenbach 2003). Weingast (1995) argues that the
discovery mechanism of government decentralization tends to promote policies that are closer
to market solutions. The author therefore speaks of market-preserving federalism and h y-
pothesizes a smaller government sector. The market-preserving role of fiscal federalism as a
means to reduce the public sector could thus be called the discovery hypothesis.
3. Review on the Empirical Literature
Numerous researchers have been concerned with the impact of fiscal federalism on the size of
government. The results are however inconclusive and, moreover, the different transmission
channels are not empirically distinguished yet. Oates (1972, p. 209-213) uses a cross-section
of 57 countries to evaluate the empirical relevance of the decentralization hypothesis. As a
proxy for the size of government he uses tax revenues as a share of national income while the
fiscal centralization variable is constructed by the ratio of central-government tax revenues on
total tax revenues. In a bivariate regression, Oates (1972) finds a significant negative relation-
ship between the centralization ratio and the size of government. However, when additionally– 5 –
controlling for income, the impact of centralization on the size of government becomes insig-
nificant. In a subsequent analysis, Oates (1985) uses two different data sets. The first consists
of the 48 contiguous states in the United States, the second of 43 countries in 1982. In a mul-
tiple regression analysis he does again not find a statistically significant impact of fiscal de-
centralization on the size of government. Similar results are obtained when he uses the num-
ber of local governments, of local governments per geographic area or of local governments
per population size as proxies for fiscal federalism (fragmentation hypothesis).
In addition, Forbes and Zampelli (1989) find a statistically significant positive impact of de-
centralization on the size of government for a sample of 345 counties at the standard metro-
politan statistical area (SMSA) level suggesting the opposite of the Leviathan hypothesis.
Similarly, Wallis and Oates (1988a) provide empirical evidence in a large historical panel
data set from the beginning of the century until the 1980
ies that more fiscally decentralized
states favor higher public spending. Stein (1999) provides empirical evidence supporting
these results with an expanding effect of decentralization on the size of government in a cross-
section analysis for 19 Latin American countries for an average between 1990 and 1995.
Nelson (1987) criticizes the proxy for decentralization used by Oates (1985). He argues that in
Oates’ data set nearly one third of all governments are special districts. Most of them only
provide one single public service like for example cemetery services and one-third of them
have no taxing powers (Nelson, 1987, p. 199). Jurisdictions with limited governmental func-
tions and taxing powers are not directly comparable with general-purpose governments.
Therefore, Nelson (1987) distinguishes between data drawn from general-purpose and single-
purpose jurisdictions of 48 US states for the fiscal year 1977. His results indicate a fairly ro-
bust support for the fragmentation hypothesis for general-purpose jurisdictions but not for
single-purpose jurisdictions. Much the same can be concluded from the study by Eberts and
Gronberg (1988) who use data from the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) level.
In an empirical investigation of the Olson (1982) hypothesis of economic sclerosis as a result
of the time length of a politically stable environment, Wallis and Oates (1988b) provide evi-
dence in a panel analysis from selected years between 1902 to 1982 (432 observations) that
fiscal concentration is positively related to the size of state and local governments. In a cross-
section regression among 3022 counties, Zax (1989) provides evidence in favor of both the
fragmentation and decentralization hypotheses using data from 1982. In addition, Raimondo
(1989) investigates the effect of federalism on specific spending categories, suggesting that
the decentralization hypothesis may hold for some public services but not for others.– 6 –
Table 1: Empirical results on the impact of federalism on the size of government
Authors Size of government Federalism Sample Time Result
Oates (1972) Total government revenue / national income Central government revenue / total government revenue 57 countries 1972 No support
DiLorenzo (1983) Local government spending per capita (general
expenditure, police, fire protection, highway,
sanitation and welfare)
Total county government expenditure (tax revenue) / government
expenditure (tax revenue) in the four largest jurisdictions
65 large SMSA 1975 Support for expenditure
No support for tax
revenue
Solano (1983) 22 government expenditure measures Dummy variable for federalist countries (Australia, Canada,
Switzerland, United States and Germany) and central government
tax revenue / total government tax revenue
18 countries 1968 Support
Total government revenue / GDP Central government revenue (expenditure) / total government
revenue (expenditure)
43 IMF countries 1982 No support Oates (1985)
State government revenue / personal income State government revenue (expenditure) / State and local govern-
ment revenue (expenditure) and total number of governmental




State and local taxes per capita (per personal
income)
State share of total state and local taxes and 49 US states 1976 No support Nelson (1986)
State and local taxes per capita (per personal
income)
Population of a state divided by the total number of counties 49 US states 1976 Support
Schneider (1986) Growth of local governments Total number of suburban municipal governments 46 large SMSA 1972-1977 No support
Nelson (1987) State and local government revenue (expendi-
ture) / personal income
Total number of general purpose governments and total number
of special purpose governments
50 US states 1977 Support
Marlow (1988) Total government expenditure / GNP State and local expenditure / Total government expenditure United States 1946-1985 Support
Eberts and Gronberg
(1988)
State and local expenditure / personal income Total number of general purpose governments and total number
of special purpose governments
280 SMSA 1977 Support







State and local revenue (expenditure) / per
capita income









Grossman (1989) Total government expenditure / GNP State and local expenditure / Total government expenditure United States 1946-1986 Support
Forbes and Zampelli
(1989)
County government revenue per capita, county
government revenue / personal income, county
government own revenue / personal income
Total number of county government in SMSA 157 SMSA 1977 No support– 7 –
Table 1 (continued): Empirical results on the impact of federalism on the size of government
Authors Size of government Federalism Sample Time Result
Zax (1989) County government share of local total revenue/
personal income
Total number of general purpose governments per square mile
and total number of special purpose governments per square mile
and County government share of local total revenue / total gov-
ernment revenue
3022 counties 1982 Support
Raimondo (1989) State and local government expenditure / per-
sonal income for six expenditure categories
(total, education, welfare, hospital, highways, all
other)
Central government expenditure / state and local expenditure and
local government expenditure / state and local expenditure
50 US states 1960, 1970, 1980 Support
Joulfaian and Marlow
(1990)
Total government expenditure / gross state
product
State and local expenditure / total government expenditure and
total governmental units in a state
48 US states 1981, 1984 Support
Joulfaian and Marlow
(1991)
Total government expenditure / gross state
product and total government expenditure per
capita
Local government expenditure / state and local government
expenditure and state and local government expenditure / Total
government expenditure and total number of local governments in
SMSA
48 US states 1983-1985 Support
Heil (1991) Total government revenue (expenditure) / GDP Dummy variable for federalist countries 22 OECD countries




Total government expenditure / GNP State and local government expenditure / total government ex-
penditure
Canada 1958-1987 Support
Shadbegian (1999) Total government expenditure / gross state
product
State and local government expenditure / total government ex-
penditure
48 US states 1979-1992 Support
Moesen and van
Cauwenberge (2000)
Total government expenditure / GDP Local government expenditure minus transfers received / total
government expenditure
19 OECD countries 1990-1992 Support
Schaltegger (2001) State and local government expenditure per
capita (all expenditure categories)
Local government expenditure / State and local government
expenditure (all expenditure categories) and total number of local
governments
26 Swiss cantons 1980-1998 Support
Kirchgässner (2002a) State and local government expenditure per
capita (total expenditure and total revenue)
Local government expenditure (revenue) / State and local gov-
ernment expenditure (revenue) and number of local governments
divided by the cantonal population
26 Swiss cantons 1980-1998 Support
Jin and Zou (2002) National, subnational or aggregate expenditure
in percent of GDP
Ratio of subnational to total government expenditure, ratio of
subnational to total government revenue, percentage of subna-
tional expenditure financed by central transfers
17 industrial and 15
developing countries
1980-1994 No support for spending
Support for revenue
measure
Rodden (2003) Total government expenditure in percent of
GDP
Own source subnational revenue in percent of total revenue 59 countries 1978-1997 Support– 8 –
One objection against the empirical results focuses on the impact of federal grants to the
states. Following the theoretical model by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981), grants from
the central level that are financed nationwide cause serious externalities as long as these
grants can be used for geographically targeted public services. According to the Leviathan
model by Brennan and Buchanan, systems of intergovernmental grants can be seen as a form
of collusive agreements by the sub-federal governments to circumvent the competitive power
of fiscal federalism. In a time series analysis of US states Grossman (1989) and of Canadian
provinces Grossman and West (1994) additionally control for grants and find support for the
collusion hypothesis. The same holds for the studies by Wyckoff (1991), Hines and Thaler
(1995) and Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1999). Including federal transfer payments to the
US states, Shadbegian (1999) also confirms the decentralization hypothesis in a panel analy-
sis from 1979 to 1992 for the US states. Schaltegger (2001) gets similar results for public
spending and Kirchgässner (2002a) for public spending as well as revenue each in a panel of
26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998. In a cross-country study for 32 states between 1980 and
1994, Jin and Zou (2002) present evidence that vertical fiscal imbalance measured as the per-
centage of subnational expenditure financed by grants from the central government increases
expenditure. In addition, their results show that expenditure decentralization does not, while
revenue decentralization does effectively restrict the size of government. Rodden (2003) also
employs an (unbalanced) panel data set of up to 59 countries between 1978 and 1997. A c-
cording to his results, decentralization measured by own source subnational revenue in per-
cent of total revenue decreases total expenditure in percent of GDP while grants increase it.
Another objection to the validity of these empirical findings is mentioned by Marlow (1988)
and Joulfaian and Marlow (1990, 1991). They argue, that previous measures of government
activity employ incomplete data since expenditures on the federal level are not included. The
share of state expenditure (revenue) of total state and local expenditure (revenue) might be the
wrong indicator because the decentralization hypothesis may still hold even if there is no sig-
nificant positive relation between this variable and the size of government as long as federal
government expenditure is reduced to such an extent that even an increase of state and/or lo-
cal expenditure in a federal system are overcompensated. After including expenditure from
the federal level on a disaggregated state-by-state basis they can find a significant negative
correlation of the overall government size and decentralization. However, it remains unclear
as to what extent state governments feel responsible for disaggregated federal expenditures
since the federal budget as a whole is a common pool that has to be financed by all other
states, too. Moreover, the federal government is the same for all US states. What does a dis-– 9 –
aggregation of federal expenditure and grants by states mean? It may be that in states with a
more pronounced federal structure the demand for federal expenditure is – ceteris paribus –
lower, a result that is not necessarily supporting the Leviathan hypothesis of Brennan and Bu-
chanan (1980). It could simply mean a shift of federal public spending from those states with
a more pronounced federal structure to those with a less pronounced one, without affecting
the total level. Thus, the really interesting question whether the government size of the US
would be larger if it had a less pronounced federal fiscal structure remains unanswered. The
results do neither support, nor contradict the proposition that countries with a federal fiscal
structure have – ceteris paribus – a smaller size of the public sector.
To test the  decentralization hypothesis, a cross-country analysis needs to be performed
(Kirchgässner 2002b). In the spirit of Oates (1972) early study, several authors have expanded
their empirical work to the country level, evaluating whether decentralized countries have
smaller government sizes than centralized ones. In a cross-section analysis of 22 OECD and
39 IMF countries, Heil (1991) cannot confirm the prediction of the Brennan and Buchanan
fragmentation hypothesis. On the other hand, Solano (1983) as well as Saunders (1988) and
Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000) find support for the expenditure cutting effect of feder-
alism for some 20 OECD countries. In the latter cases the samples are, however, rather small.
Because the measure of decentralization used by  Moesen and van  Cauwenberge (2000) is
only that part of local government spending which is entirely financed by local taxes (in rela-
tion to total government spending), they nevertheless capture the degree of local fiscal inde-
pendence better than earlier studies. The above-mentioned results by Jin and Zou (2002) in
the case of revenue decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance, and particularly by Rodden
(2003) for the own source subnational revenue share confirm the results of Moesen and van
Cauwenberge (2000) by using larger cross-country panel data sets. All of these studies focus
on the competencies of subnational jurisdictions in the area of taxation and thereby establish a
restrictive effect of a stronger competitive fiscal federalism on the size of government.
Another route for departure is an analysis of the different transmission channels outlined
above. Fiscal decentralization implies several mechanisms that might affect government
spending. The mixed empirical results on the decentralization hypothesis might as well be due
to the fact that several mechanisms compensate for each other, as Sørensen (2002) argues
with respect to the opposing impacts of tax competition and tax exporting. If the different
effects can be identified, a much more precise picture is drawn of how fiscal decentralization
affects government size. More importantly, an analysis at the national level usually has the
disadvantage that the spending and taxing competencies or the degree of autonomy of sub-– 10 –
federal jurisdictions is not properly assessed. It is hence useful to conduct such an analysis for
Switzerland as a country with strong fiscal competencies at the sub-federal levels.
4. The Swiss Tax System
Switzerland consists of three governmental layers: the central government, 26 cantons on the
state level and some 3000 municipalities on the local level. The Swiss Constitution allows for
comparably high fiscal competencies on the sub-federal level. All three tiers of government
have their own tax sovereignty. Cantons are free to choose their taxes autonomously, except
they are constitutionally reserved for the central government. The Federal Constitution ex-
plicitly lists all revenue sources of the central government in Article 42. The central govern-
ment cannot levy new taxes or attract tax power from the cantons without changing the con-
stitution which, in Switzerland, has to pass a mandatory popular referendum with a simple
majority of the people as well as of the cantons. Additionally, the federal power to tax for
income underlies a sunset legislation and has to be approved by voters every few years. His-
torically, the main taxing powers are assigned to the cantons. Even the tax harmonization law
introduced in 1993 (Article 129 of the Federal Constitution) does not affect the cantonal com-
petence with respect to tax surcharges, tax rates and tax exemptions. Cantons have the main
taxing powers for individual and corporate income and property whereas the local govern-
ments levy a surcharge on the cantonal income tax and raise their own property (wealth) tax.
The fiscal autonomy of municipalities varies considerably from canton to canton, but even in
rather centralized cantons communes are not forced to keep tax rates on a certain level. There-
fore, tax burdens vary even more among Swiss municipalities than among cantons.
Table 2 exhibits the variation of income and property taxes between the cantons for the year
2001. The index of the weighted average for Switzerland is 100, whereas the canton  Jura
reaches the maximum value of 134.3 and the canton Zug the minimum value of 49.5. For in-
stance, a single person who earns a gross income of 100,000 CHF is charged for 19,640 CHF
income taxes on the cantonal and local level in the town of La Chaux-de-Fonds of the canton
Neuchâtel. The same person living in the village of Freienbach of the canton Schwyz has to
pay 4,790 CHF income taxes on the cantonal and local level only (church taxes included). The
federal government relies on indirect taxes like the VAT and the mineral oil tax, but also
raises a tax on income of individuals and corporations in addition to the cantons. Presently,
the federal income tax covers about 60% of total federal revenue. The tax rates for the income
tax on the central level are explicitly enumerated in the constitution. Currently, the statutory
maximum average rate amounts for 11.5% with a maximum marginal rate of 13.2%.– 11 –
Table 2:  Tax burden and financial prosperity of Swiss cantons, 2001;














Zug 49.6 216 26.1
Basel-City 118.9 173 10.8
Zurich 82.5 160 15.1
Geneva 90.2 141 9.7
Nidwalden 75.5 129 39.6
Basel-Land 89.6 120 15.0
Cantons with average financial
potential
Schwyz 65.5 112 40.4
Schaffhausen 114.5 107 17.7
Aargau 86.5 97 19.3
Vaud 111.7 94 19.1
Thurgau 110.7 83 25.7
Solothurn 114 82 26.8
Glarus 105.9 82 26.8
Ticino 80.9 82 23.3
St. Gallen 101.8 80 24.9
Graubünden 95.1 77 47.1
Luzern 123.7 67 27.9
Uri 116.2 64 48.8
Appenzell a.Rh. 108.6 63 29.6
Appenzell i.Rh. 87.9 62 38.7
Financially weak cantons
Bern 115.7 57 28.2
Neuchâtel 125.5 55 38.8
Fribourg 130 51 35.3
Obwalden 126.7 35 44.5
Jura 134.9 34 48.6
Valais 125.1 30 41.7
Switzerland 100 100 23.1
Source: Swiss Federal Tax Administration, 2001, Swiss Federal Finance Administration, 1999
As can be seen from Table 3, the distribution of revenue and expenditure among the three
layers of government changed considerably over time. Contrary to the increase in many other
countries, the share of the central government in total government expenditure and revenue
even decreased by about 10 percentage points within the last fifty years. Today, the financial– 12 –
importance of the sub-federal governments accounts for nearly 70% of all financial flows of
the total government.
Table 3: Structure of revenue and expenditure in the Swiss federalism, 1950 – 1999
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
% % % % % %
Central gov-
ernment
Revenue 42 40 34 30 31 31
Expenditure 38 35 32 31 31 32
Cantons
Revenue 32 33 39 39 39 40
Expenditure 34 38 40 39 40 40
Municipalities
Revenue 26 27 27 31 30 29
Expenditure 28 27 28 30 29 28
Total*
Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100
Expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 100
* without double counting
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland, 2000, Table 18.1
All in all, with considerable tax autonomy, including progressive income and property
(wealth) taxes, the Swiss sub-federal governments constitute a unique data base to investigate
the effect of federalism on the size of government on the European continent. Though many
other federalist countries in Europe have the power to spend, they have rather limited power
to tax which in principle implies that analyzing the effect of fiscal federalism on the size of
government is biased in these countries, at best.
5. Data and Empirical Specification
In order to test the empirical relevance of federalism on the size of government for the Swiss
case, we first propose the following model:
Rit = b0 + b1 DECit + b2 FRAGit + b3TAXCOMPit + b4TAXEXPit +b5GRANTSit +b6Vit + uit (1)
where Rit stands for the revenue side of the budget. More precisely, we have a closer look at
real per capita revenue of the cantonal and local level as well as at the revenue categories,– 13 –
namely income, property, profit and capital tax revenue as well as user charges. As can be
seen in Table 4, tax revenue accounts for about 55% of all government revenue on the canto-
nal and local levels. This ratio continuously diminished during the last twenty years from
about 60% to 55%, while the ratio of user charges on total state and local government revenue
remained rather constant at about 20%. Thus, other revenue sources like intergovernmental
grants have gained quantitative importance during the last 20 years. Looking a bit closer on
tax revenue, the numbers indicate that income taxes are by far the most important tax revenue
category on the state and local levels with a ratio of more than one third of all revenue.
The model implies that public revenue is a function of revenue decentralization (DECit) the
fragmentation of a jurisdiction, i.e. the competitive pressure in which the government is in-
volved (FRAGit), grants (GRANTSit) which address the impact of vertical transfer payments
from the central government to cantonal governments, and a vector of control variables Vit. b0
to b6 are the parameters of interest while uit denotes the error term. Vit  consists of national
income disaggregated to the cantonal level according to the interpretation of Wagner's Law
(1892) of a possible income effect on the demand of public goods. In order to evaluate the
effect of a homogenous income distribution on the size of government revenue, we introduce
a variable which is constructed by the ratio of median to average income in a canton. Follow-
ing Meltzer and Richard (1981), it could be hypothesized that the lower is median as com-
pared to average income the higher the pressure to exploit the richer minority by the poorer
majority in a democracy. The ratio of urban population in a canton reflects the effect of
population density on fiscal policy decisions of governments. The population variable takes
economies of scale into account: Can larger cantons benefit from economies of scale in order
to reach a lower level of public expenditures? We thus follow the suggestions by Borcherding
and Deacon (1972) for US states or Pommerehne and Frey (1976) for Swiss municipalities. A
negative sign of the coefficients of these variables indicates that the larger the population the
lower the level of the endogenous fiscal variables. We also include the cantonal unemploy-
ment rate and a German language dummy as controls. The impact of democracy is incorpo-
rated by an index for the extent to which direct democracy is established on the cantonal level
(for a description of the Index, c.f. Stutzer and Frey (2000) and Trechsel and Serdült (1999)).
According to previous empirical work (c.f. Section 3), we expect a revenue cutting effect by
the instruments of direct democracy. In addition, a variable incorporating budget rules on the
cantonal level is included. They can be seen as a supplementary instrument to constrain the
taxing power of policymakers (Schaltegger, 2002). We also include a coalition variable in
order to empirically evaluate the effect of broad based coalition governments on the exploita-– 14 –
tion of the budget as a fiscal commons. The argument that the tax base represents a fiscal
commons that will be exploited by too many spending ministers is developed by Roubini und
Sachs (1989), Edin und Ohlsson (1991), Corsetti und  Roubini (1992), de Haan und Sturm
(1997), Kontopoulos und Perotti (1999), Velasco (1999) or Volkerink and de Haan (2001).
Table 4:   Selected revenue categories on the cantonal and communal level
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 Revenue categories
% % % % % %
Total revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100
thereof:
- User charges 21 22 21 19 20 21
- Total tax revenue* 61 62 61 58 55 54
- Income and property** 58 59 59 56 53 52
- Income 41 42 39 40 38 36
- Property 4 4 4 4 4 4
- Profit 6 6 7 6 5 6
- Capital 2 2 2 2 2 2
Source: Swiss Federal Finance Administration, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001
* According to the definition of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration, Total tax revenue are the sum of
income and property taxes and expenditure taxes.
**According to the definition of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration, income and property taxes are the
sum of income, property, profit, capital, land, property gain, property change and inheritance taxes.
The focus of the analysis is on the impact of federalism on the size of government which is
tested by five different variables: revenue decentralization, fragmentation, tax competition,
tax exporting and grants. Decentralization as the local fiscal autonomy is proxied by the ratio
of local revenue on the aggregated state and local revenue. The fragmentation variable is con-
structed by the number of communes in a canton divided by population. In both cases, a
negative impact on government revenue is expected. Tax competition is measured by the
weighted average of the competing cantons’ tax burden in the highest income tax bracket of a
million Swiss francs annual taxable income. The competing cantons are all cantons except the
one of consideration, weighted by the inverse of the distance (see Feld and Reulier, 2002 for a
discussion of empirical studies). This variable indicates that the higher the average tax burden
of the other cantons, the lower the pressure of tax competition on the cantonal and local tax
authorities and the higher is tax revenue. Tax exporting is measured by the number of tourist– 15 –
nights per capita. Tax exporting possibilities relax the pressure that exit and voice exert on
fiscal authorities. Tax exporting thus leads to higher tax revenue. Using this variable, we pri-
marily capture tax exporting by the burden tourists bear especially by paying tourist fees. On
the other hand, the attractiveness of a canton which is reflected in the number of tourist nights
per capita might also allow for higher taxation of property owners. Finally, grants change the
incentive structure for policymakers as argued in Section 2 and relax the pressure from mi-
gration to a government that overtaxes or overspends.
The analysis is performed for the revenue categories in  Table 4  so that for every revenue
category a corresponding variable for decentralization is constructed. With respect to the
revenue structure it can be particularly expected that tax competition and tax exporting affect
tax revenue categories in the predicted way instead of user charge revenue. The quantitative
impact of these two variables can be expected to be the larger the more intense tax competi-
tion or the more easily taxes can be exported. An intensive tax competition might as well in-
duce fiscal authorities to finance spending more strongly by user charges such that an increase
of the average of other cantons’ tax burden leads to less regard of the benefit principle.
As indicated above, a revenue restricting impact of fiscal decentralization may be the result of
many different influences, among them fragmentation, tax competition and tax exporting.
These three mechanisms are explicitly controlled for by the respective variables in the model.
If decentralization still exerts a significant effect after the introduction of these three vari-
ables, it might well be the result of political economy influences. A decentralized competitive
government structure allows for an experimentation of new public policies such that federal-
ism works as a discovery procedure. Although other influences might be hiding in the decen-
tralization variable, we propose that it predominantly captures the discovery hypothesis.
In order to test the hypotheses, the focus of the empirical analysis is on the aggregated state
and local level. The analysis uses yearly data from 1980 to 1998 deflated to the year 1980.
The subscript i = 1, ..., 26 indicates cantons and t = 1980, ..., 1998 indexes years (for data de-
scription, data source and descriptive statistics, cf. Appendix A). The empirical analysis is
performed using a pooled cross-section time-series model. We follow Feld and Kirchgässner
(2001), who argue that despite the panel structure of the data the inclusion of fixed effects in
the cross-section domain is inappropriate because the institutional variables reflecting the ex-
tent of federalism vary only very little or remain constant over time in a few cantons. A c-
cordingly, cantonal intercepts do not make sense as the captured impact on fiscal outcomes is
either solely driven by the time variation or in case of time invariant variables, fixed effects– 16 –
are likely to hide the effect of institutional variables and render them insignificant. The con-
sistency of OLS-estimates depends on the exogeneity of the regressands. In order to tackle the
problem of possible endogeneity of the decentralization variable, we use an instrumental vari-
able technique with lags t-1 of the original decentralization as well as spatial lags of all re-
gressands as instruments for the tax competition variable. Finally, year effects to circumvent
time dependency are included and the standard errors are corrected by the clustering method.
6. Results
The test strategy is first estimating the model with the decentralization and grants variables
and second, additionally including the three specific mechanisms by which federalism affects
government size. The overall results in Table 5 indicate that fiscally more decentralized can-
tons have smaller governments measured by public revenue as predicted by the decentraliza-
tion hypothesis. This is true for total government revenue and for tax revenue but not for user
charges. Looking at the tax revenue categories, some interesting differences can be distin-
guished as well. Taxes on income are significantly reduced under revenue decentralization
whereas taxes on property and wealth are not touched by differences in the assignment of
taxes between the cantonal and the communal level. Taxes on income and property as a whole
are negatively affected by fiscal decentralization as well. Interestingly, decentralizing corpo-
rate taxes leads to less capital taxes while taxes on profits are not significantly reduced. All in
all, the obtained results show that fiscal decentralization favors a smaller size of government
revenue in Switzerland as predicted by Oates (1972) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
Introducing fragmentation, tax competition and tax exporting, the effect of fiscal decentrali-
zation is reduced in magnitude but exhibits the same structure of effects. Still there is no sig-
nificant impact of revenue decentralization on revenue from user charges, on property and
profit tax revenue. The statistical significances of the decentralization impacts are increased
however such that the estimated effects appear to be more precisely estimated. Controlling for
fragmentation, tax exporting and competition, the remaining effect of decentralization mainly
appears to capture political economy effects as the one summarized in the discovery hypothe-
sis. Decentralized decision-making keeps government revenue low. The fragmentation hy-
pothesis does not seem to be relevant in the Swiss case since the estimation results exhibit
insignificant results. Only with respect to the tax structure two notable effects can be found:
Tax revenue from income taxes is negatively affected by fragmentation though only margin-
ally significant while capital tax revenue is significantly positively influenced.– 17 –
Table 5: TSLS estimates for government size, revenue structure, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Total revenue




Tax on income Tax on profits Tax on capital
Decentralization -0.423** -0.390** -0.153** -0.137*** 0.183 0.196 -0.439*** -0.396*** -0.209 0.012 -0.662*** -0.611*** -0.116 -0.172 -0.861** -0.988***
(-2.33) (-2.67) (2.42) (-3.26) (1.29) (1.41) (-3.14) (4.20) (-0.90) (0.04) (-3.24) (-4.35) (-0.45) (-0.62) (-2.42) (-3.72)
Fragmentation 12.530 19.416 85.332 24.473 38.181 -125.400 137.383 620.078***
(0.25) (0.30) (0.95) (0.44) (0.32) (-1.65) (0.69) (5.15)
Tax competition 0.052*** 0.020* 0.011 0.020* 0.060** 0.031** -0.017 -0.045
(3.32) (1.78) (0.56) (1.86) (2.43) (2.55) (-0.38) (-1.59)
Tax exporting 0.013 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.182*** 0.021 0.089 0.211***
(1.25) (3.48) (2.83) (3.24) (3.73) (0.82) (1.39) (4.07)
Grants 0.250*** 0.212*** -0.041 -0.092** 0.162** 0.095 -0.062 -0.099*** 0.070 -0.048 -0.104** -0.073 -0.152 -0.277** 0.262 0.085
(4.86) (6.59) (-0.87) (-2.53) (2.03) (1.53) (-1.41) (-3.08) (0.68) (-0.48) (-2.45) (-1.67) (-1.16) (-2.55) (1.44) (-0.89)
Democracy -0.141* -0.152 0.293*** -0.319** -0.562 -0.069 -0.258** -0.309*** -0.578*** -0.693*** -0.161 -0.262* -0.596* -0.424 0.077 0.416*
(-1.94) (-1.54) (-2.88) (-2.77) (-0.38) (-0.43) (2.58) (-2.91) (-2.92) (-4.00) (-1.11) (-1.89) (-1.76) (-1.44) (0.21) (1.98)
Budget rule -0.011 -0.006 -0.014 -0.010 0.016 0.022 -0.016 -0.0169 -0.331 -0.030 -0.011 -0.023 -0.042 -0.011 -0.096 -0.037
(-0.42) (-0.29) (-0.43) (-0.39) (0.70) (0.60) (-0.49) (-0.68) (-1.14) (-0.55) (-0.34) (-0.82) (-0.52) (-0.15) (-1.23) (-0.47)
Coalition 0.028* 0.042** -0.006 0.012 0.088*** 0.094*** -0.014 -0.001 0.044 0.099 -0.007 0.016 -0.109** -0.102** -0.106 -0.128*
(1.97) (2.70) (-0.35) (0.57) (2.90) (3.65) (-1.08) (-0.03) (0.75) (1.64) (-0.30) (0.64) (2.52) (-2.32) (-1.66) (-1.82)
Cantonal income 0.296** 0.280** 0.405*** 0.385*** 0.116 0.113 0.399*** 0.383*** 0.474 0.442 -0.010 -0.055 1.984*** 2.001*** 2.404*** 2.506***
(2.13) (2.59) (2.94) (4.00) (0.48) (0.55) (3.28) (4.44) (1.67) (1.35) (-0.05) (-0.38) (9.33) (9.05) (7.64) (7.90)
Homogeneity 0.169 0.147 0.156 0.120 0.150 0.114 0.102 0.063 0.051 -0.006 0.167 0.120 -0.167 -0.141 -0.389 -0.383
(1.67) (1.65) (1.34) (1.21) (0.89) (0.73) (0.88) (0.66) (0.19) (-0.02) (1.01) (1.01) (-0.67) (-0.40) (-1.05) (-1.65)
Population 0.028 -0.039 0.003 -0.086*** 0.006 -0.082** 0.011 -0.063*** -0.775 -0.320*** 0.021 -0.004 -0.055 -0.166* 0.122 -0.161
(1.49) (-1.59) (0.14) (-3.21) (0.17) (-2.37) (0.59) (-2.84) (-1.14) (-3.64) (0.80) (-0.11) (-0.81) (-2.04) (1.50) (-1.45)
Urban 0.284*** 0.280*** 0.384*** 0.370*** 0.445** 0.501** 0.372*** 0.356*** 0.393 0.363 0.292*** 0.120 0.366 0.552 -0.068 0.598*
(3.77) (4.02) (4.34) (5.32) (2.31) (2.67) (4.07) (5.16) (1.70) (1.19) (2.82) (1.24) (1.18) (1.57) (-0.20) (1.76)
Unemployment 0.015 0.020 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.032 0.005 0.008 -0.027 -0.016 0.012 -0.001 0.024 0.051 -0.015 0.064*
(1.04) (1.52) (0.52) (0.98) (0.73) (1.10) (0.32) (0.58) (0.87) (-0.46) (0.70) (-0.06) (0.70) (1.32) (-0.33) (1.85)
0.078 0.117 0.020 0.085 0.226* 0.284** -0.024 0.061 0.473** 0.683*** -0.000 0.098 0.091 -0.0224 -0.260 -0.408** German
language (1.56) (1.43) (0.31) (0.93) (1.94) (20.5) (-0.42) (0.80) (2.81) (4.24) (-0.00) (1.04) (0.47) (-0.09) (-1.06) (-2.25)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 0.827 0.866 0.836 0.882 0.576 0.615 0.867 0.902 0.563 0.559 0.778 0.840 0.737 0.750 0.671 0.793
Jarque-Bera 7.626** 0.195 2.662 0.191 11.027*** 3.448 1.813 0.382 17.552*** 7.869** 10.167*** 4.206 1.600 0.039 26.165*** 4.414
Note:
Government size stands for state and local revenues per capita. t-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals. Instruments: all regressands and lagged t-1 values of the decentralization variable. Spatial lags of all regressands but
decentralization, tax competition, tax exporting and fragmentation. General revenue: Dummy for Appenzell a.Rh. in year 1996 included for total revenue equation, since this canton had exceptional revenue at that year when they
sold their cantonal bank to the UBS.– 18 –
The tax competition variable exhibits the expected positive sign indicating that a higher aver-
age tax burden of competing cantons relaxes the competitive pressure on cantonal fiscal
authorities. Tax competition does however not have a statistically significant effect on user
charges and only a marginally significant impact on tax revenue on the 10 percent level.
Looking at the tax structure, it becomes obvious that tax competition is the most restrictive in
the case of income and property (wealth) tax revenues, but does not have any effect on profit
and capital tax revenues. Hence the tax competition hypothesis cannot be rejected according
to these results. Tax exporting on the other hand has a strong influence on several revenue
categories. Tax exporting possibilities increase government revenue in the case of tax reve-
nue, user charges and taxes on income and property in general. From single tax revenue com-
ponents, property and capital taxes appear to be positively affected while income and profits
taxes are not. These results are in line with the hypotheses formulated above. In the case of
user charges, exporting of financial burden to tourists is possible in a similar fashion as in the
case of indirect taxes. Hence, the competitive pressure on cantonal governments is reduced
and revenue from user charges increases. On the other hand, cantons that are attractive to
tourists enable the government to exploit property and capital owners to a larger extent. The
attractiveness of the area is positively capitalized in property (wealth) and capital taxes.
The grants variable is positive and significant for general revenue, but negative for tax reve-
nue. This is reasonable since grants are one source of income for the sub-national govern-
ments, enabling them to reduce the tax burden for their constituency without being forced to
reduce government spending as well. This strategy is especially attractive for politicians in the
case of income and property as well as profit taxes.
Thus, the effect of federalism on the size of government in Switzerland stems from decen-
tralization and the fiscal autonomy of sub-federal governments in the possibility of deciding
about tax instruments on their own and the resulting tax competition, but not from the com-
petitive pressure of having many governmental units. Tax competition is effectively restrict-
ing the government in the case of income and property (wealth) taxes. Tax exporting partly
compensates the revenue reducing effect of tax competition and leads to higher tax revenue,
but does not suffice to compensate the revenue restriction imposed by tax competition with
respect to total revenue. Though fragmentation empirically has not proven to be a significant
determinant explaining the size of government revenue, it has to be noted that it is to some
extent a precondition for fiscal decentralization. Thus, it might be that fragmentation has an
indirect effect on the size of government revenue. The impact of decentralization on govern-– 19 –
ment size may additionally stem from the cost saving decentralized experimentation of new
government policies.
Looking at the democracy variable, we obtain similar results as for the decentralization vari-
able. The stronger popular rights in a canton the smaller the revenue burden voters have to
bear. In contrast to decentralization, direct popular rights mainly reduce income and property
(wealth) taxes but not profit taxes. The overall results are in line with those reported by Feld
and Kirchgässner (2001) and Feld and Matsusaka (2002). Interestingly, budget rules have
essentially no effect on state and local tax revenues in Switzerland. However, as shown by
Schaltegger (2002), statutory requirements in the cantons reduce cantonal spending as well as
budget deficits. As can be seen by the results in Table 5, the hypothesis of broad based coali-
tion governments that tend to exploit the fiscal resources finds support for total government
revenue. This finding is consistent with those found by Volkerink and de Haan (2001) for
OECD-countries. For tax revenue we cannot find support for the coalition hypothesis with
respect to the case of Swiss sub-federal governments implying that broad based coalition gov-
ernments tend to expand government revenue by raising user charges.
Wagner’s Law becomes confirmed for the revenue structure as a whole by the positive and
significant impact of cantonal income on the revenue measures. User charges are however not
correlated with income. The homogeneity of income distribution and unemployment have no
effect on the size of the government. The results for the variable population are inconclusive
but the share of urban population in a canton has a positive and significant impact on the
whole revenue structure implying possible agglomeration effects in urban areas which pro-
mote economic activity and thus favor higher government revenue. Unemployment does not
have a significant effect of cantonal revenue. The language variable is only significant in the
case of user charges and property taxes.
As we observe different effects of federalism on the size of tax revenue as compared to the
size of user charges, a natural question occurs in this context: What is the effect of federalism
on the distribution between taxes and user charges? It could be argued that decentralization
strengthens the benefit principle where consumers are more likely to be confronted with mar-
ginal costs of their decisions (Wicksell, 1896). Thus, decentralization might favor govern-
ments to rely more on user charges and less on taxes. If this were true, decentralization should
have a negative effect on the ratio of tax revenue on total revenue. In order to conduct a for-
mal test we regress log-odds of the tax revenue ratio on the regressands of equation (1).– 20 –
Table 6:   TSLS Log-odds estimates for the tax ratio of total government revenue,
26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
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Note: Government size stands for state and local revenues. t-values are given in parentheses. All regres-
sions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of nor-
mality of the residuals. Instruments: all regressands and lagged t-1 values of the decentralization variable.
Spatial lags of all  regressands but decentralization, tax competition, tax exporting and fragmentation for
equation in second column.
As can be seen from Table 6, decentralization in fact favors a smaller ratio of tax revenue on
total government revenue. Thus, the hypothesis, that decentralization strengthens the benefit
principle between government spending and government revenue cannot be rejected accord-
ing to the results obtained for the Swiss state and local level. It also remains significantly– 21 –
negative if the three transmission mechanisms, fragmentation, tax competition and tax ex-
porting, are included in the regression. From the specific mechanisms only tax competition
has a significant impact. The more favorable the position of a canton is in the tax competition
with other cantons the more the canton relies on taxes instead of user charges. The fragmen-
tation and tax exporting variables have only a weak explanatory power for the tax share of
total government revenue. Interestingly, direct democracy has the same effect as decentraliza-
tion in the presented results which supports findings by Feld and Matsusaka (2002).
All in all, the results for the Swiss federalism indicate that revenue decentralization favors a
smaller size of government revenue. This especially holds for tax revenue but not for user
charges. Moreover, decentralization favors a shift of revenue instruments of the government
from taxes to user charges. Tax competition tends to restrict the taxation of income and prop-
erty while tax exporting relaxes the pressure on fiscal authorities. The remaining negative
effect of decentralization on government revenue is conjectured to be due to political econ-
omy reasons.
7. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to test the effect of federalism on the size of government. As a
survey on the empirical literature shows, up to now many authors have been concerned with
the evaluation of the validity of the Leviathan-hypothesis arguing that constitutional restric-
tions like federalism strengthen political competition and therefore lead to a smaller size of
government. The overall results are not conclusive even though supportive studies have re-
cently gained more attention. However, most studies are performed in a US context.
This study uses data from Switzerland to evaluate the question of federalism and its impact on
the size of government. Swiss federalism allows for a far reaching fiscal autonomy on the
revenue side of the budget for sub-national governments and therefore represents a unique
data base to investigate the Leviathan-hypothesis within Europe. The present work suggests
that federalism measured by revenue decentralization has a strong revenue cutting effect. This
is true for general revenue for cantons and municipalities as well as for most revenue catego-
ries. An interesting exception concerns user charges. Decentralization appears to restrict the
government’s taxing abilities mainly by tax competition and political economy mechanisms.
Tax exporting only partially reduces the pressure on the fisc. A natural question that emerges
in this context is whether federalism would strengthen the benefit principle of government
spending and revenue. Thus, we test the impact of federalism on the ratio of tax revenue from
total government revenue as well. The results show that decentralization in fact leads to a sig-– 22 –
nificant smaller ratio of tax revenue on total government revenue implying that user charges
play a more prominent role in financing government activity in a competitive federalism.
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